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FEDERAL IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS FROM STATE AND LOCAL

TAXATION:

A SURVEY OF RECENT

DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES
SEALY

H.

GAVIN, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

Although the Constitution of the United States does not expressly prohibit state and local taxation of federal activities, the federal courts have
developed a constitutionally implied tax immunity. The immunity doctrine,
although a fundament of our federalism, has undergone a number of transformations. These transformations have caused confusion in the area and
have compelled the Supreme Court to observe that "the line between the
taxable and the immune has been drawn by an unsteady hand."' More
recently, the Court described the tax immunity doctrine as "a 'much litigated and often confused field,' one that has been marked from the begin2
ning by inconsistent decisions and excessively delicate distinctions." It is
not, however, the purpose of this article to criticize the Court for its judicial
wanderings. Instead, this article is designed to provide practical guidance to
federal procurement officials concerning the extent to which the federal immunity doctrine may be applied to immunize government contractors and
their activities from state and local taxation. Part I traces the development
of the federal immunity doctrine and, in particular, the development of Government contractor's immunity from state and local taxation. Part II discusses three recent decisions concerning federal immunity and its application
to Government contractors. Part III discusses the impact of these decisions
on Government procurement policies. Part IV concludes the article.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

Few constitutional concepts have been as elastic as the federal immunity doctrine. Following the announcement of the doctrine in M'Culloch v.
Maland,3 the Court went through two distinct phases. First, for more than
*
Associate of Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, Albuquerque, New Mexico. B.S.
1977 New Mexico State University. J.D. 1980 Texas Tech University School of Law. L.L.M.
1984 Georgtown University Law Center.
At the time this article was written the author served as an Attorney/Advisor in the Air
Force General Counsel's Office and was a member of the Department of Defense Tax Policy
and Advisory Group.
1. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 176 (1944).
2. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 730 (1982) (quoting United States v. City of
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958)).
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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a century, the Court expanded the scope of the doctrine to encompass almost
every conceivable entity and activity related to the activities of the Federal
Government. Second, there was a significant contraction of the expanded
doctrine. Part I is designed to give the reader a general understanding of the
historical development of the federal immunity doctrine as it applies to Government contractors and has been divided into two subparts: (A) the origin
and expansion of the federal immunity doctrine; and (B) the contraction of
the federal immunity doctrine.
A.

Origin and Expansion of the Federal Immunity Doctrine

In M'Culloch, the State of Maryland sought to impose a tax on the operations of the Bank of the United States. The Maryland statute required any
bank established in Maryland, without authority of the State, to purchase
stamped paper for the printing of certain notes. The amount of the tax was
two percent of the face value of the notes. 4 In the alternative, the Bank
could make an annual, advance payment of $15,000 to the State.5 Chief
Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, rejected the Maryland
6
taxing scheme as unconstitutional.
After disposing of the state's assertion that Congress was without constitutional authority to create the Bank, the Court proceeded to answer the
question of whether the State of Maryland could constitutionally tax a federal instrumentality. The supremacy clause is clearly the foundation upon
which M'Culloch rests. While noting that there is no express provision in the
Constitution exempting the Bank from the power of the state to tax its operations, Marshall stated that it was the essence of supremacy to exempt the
Federal Government from the influence of subordinate governments' activities, and such result was necessarily implied by the declaration of
supremacy.7 And, in response to the state's argument that the Constitution
leaves it the power to tax with the confidence that the state will not abuse
that power, Marshall noted:
The only security against the abuse of this power, is found in the
structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature
acts upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security
against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a
right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the exigencies
of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the
exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard them against its abuse. But the means employed by
the Government of the Union have no such security, nor is the
right of a state to tax them sustained by the same theory. Those
means are not given by the people of a particular state, not given
by the constituents of the legislature, which claim the right to tax
4. Id. at
5. Id. at
6. Id. at
7. Id. at

320-21.

321.
436.
427.
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them, but by the people of all the states. They are given by all for
the benefit of all-and upon theory, should be subjected to that
government only which belongs to all. 8
Thus, finding that there were no political checks to prevent the state from
abusing its taxing power with respect to federal activities, the Court initiated
the doctrine of federal immunity from state and local taxation. The doctrine
"is so deeply rooted in American constitutional law that it seems fair to characterize it as a cornerstone of our federal system." 9 And, although "the doctrinal declarations and limitations on state and local taxing power set forth
in M'Culloch have subsequently been reinterpreted, and in some respects very
the basic immunity concept has never been
materially changed, ...
abrogated."'°
For more than a century after the M'Culloch decision, the Court substantially expanded the federal immunity concept. In addition to federal
instrumentalities, the federal immunity umbrella was extended to, inter aha,
Government employees, lessees of Government property, and independent
contractors providing supplies and services to the Government. Since many
of the cases rendered during this expansionary period have been subsequently overruled or significantly limited, they do not deserve extended coverage. However, in order to understand the significance of the subsequent
contraction of federal immunity which is discussed at subpart B of this Part,
a brief survey of the more notable decisions is appropriate.
Ten years after M'Culloch, in Weston v. Charleston, ' the Court ruled that
a property tax imposed by a local government on federal securities owned by
private parties was unconstitutional. The issue in Weston was whether a local government could require private parties to include federal securities in
their property tax base. A divided Weston Court held that the tax was an
unconstitutional interference with the power of Congress to borrow money
on the credit of the United States. The tax was, in the Court's view, "a tax
on the contract [between the Government and the individual that owned the
securities], a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United
States, and . . . repugnant to the Constitution." 12 Thus, Weston expanded
M'Culloch's federal immunity umbrella by extending it to contractual relationships between private parties and the Government.
In Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erte Couny, '3 the doctrine of federal immunity was expanded to cover state and local taxes on employees of the Federal
Government. In Dobbbns, the State of Pennsylvania authorized the imposition of a tax, roughly measured by compensation, on "all offices and posts of
profit." 14 The taxpayer was a captain in the United States revenue cutter
service; his office was created by an Act of Congress to regulate the collection
8. Id at 428-29.
9. P Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation, § 6:2, at 236-37 (1981) [herein-

after cited as Hartman].
10. Id. at 237.
11.

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).

12. Id at 469.
13.
14.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
Id at 445.
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of duties on imports.1 5 The taxing authority assessed a tax measured by the
taxpayer's compensation and taxpayer challenged the tax on constitutional
grounds. The Court, holding for the taxpayer, found the tax to be constitutionally offensive under the federal immunity doctrine announced in
M'Culloch. The Dobbins Court noted that the congressionally created office
of the taxpayer was a means chosen by Congress to execute its sovereign
powers.' 6 As such, taxation of the taxpayer is no less objectionable than the
taxation of the vessel he commands, which is clearly not subject to tax by
state or local authorities.' 7 The Court then noted that its decision was not
based on a technical reading of the statute, and was "applicable to exempt
the salaries of all officers of the United States from taxation by the states."1 8
In this context, the Court expressed that Congress had absolute discretion to
determine the compensation of an officer of the United States, and that a
state may not constitutionally diminish this compensation. 19
The case of Gillesp/'e v. Oklahoma 2° extended the federal immunity doctrine to cover lessees of Government lands. In Gllespie, the State of
Oklahoma imposed a nondiscriminatory tax on net income derived by a
lessee of Government lands from sales of oil and gas received under the
lease. 2 ' With regard to a tax on leases, the Gillespie Court cited the following
passage from an earlier opinion: "A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the
power to make them, and could be used to destroy the power to make
them."'2 2 The Court also noted that a tax on the net profits from those leases
constitutes a "direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the
best terms that it can for its wards."' 23 Therefore, because the tax upon lessees profits from the lease might interfere with the negotiation process, Gillespie extended federal immunity to lessees of Government property whose only
connection with the Government was the leased property.
Shortly after Gillespie, in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mssissipp', 24 the Court applied the federal immunity doctrine to exempt an independent contractor
from a state sales tax on the sale of goods to the Federal Government. In
Panhandle, the State of Mississippi imposed an excise tax of one cent per
gallon on the contractor for the privilege of selling gasoline. The contractor
argued that with respect to its sales to the Federal Government the federal
immunity doctrine conferred immunity. The Panhandle majority agreed
with the taxpayer finding the tax a burden on the constitutional powers of
the United States. In this regard, the Panhandle majority, noting that the
right to make sales to the United States Government was not given by the
15. Id. at 436.
16. Id at 448.
17. Id
18. Id at 449. While the tax was expressly on "all offices and posts of profit," the state
argued that the subject of the tax was the compensation received. The Court did not agree with
the state's interpretation, but noted that its decision was not based on such a technicality. Id.
19. Id at 450.
20. 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
21. Id at 503.
22. Id at 505 (quoting, Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 530
(1916)).
23. Id at 506.
24. 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
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state nor dependent on state laws, held that states could not impose any tax
upon transactions with the United States. 25 But, Panhandle is best
remembered for the telling dissent by Justice Holmes which predicted the
upcoming constriction of the federal immunity doctrine.
Holmes felt that the Mississippi tax should be sustained. He recognized, however, in light of the dicta in M'Culloch that "the power to tax is the
power to destroy," that his view was not plainly right. 26 Holmes responded
to Marshall's famous, absolutist dicta in the following fashion:
In those days it was not recognized as it is today that most of the
distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If the states had
any power it was assumed that they had all power, and that the
necessary alternative was to deny it altogether. But this court
which so often has defeated the attempt to tax in certain ways can
defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far without
power to tax is not the
wholly abolishing the power to tax. The
27
power to destroy while this court sits.
In conclusion, Holmes noted that the question of interference is not one of
absolutes but rather "one of reasonableness and degree and it seems to me
that the interference in this case is too remote [to support the majority's
position]. "28
B.

Contraction of the Federal Immuni'ty Doctrine." The Legal Incidence Test

In subpart A the origin and expansion of the federal immunity doctrine
were covered. Following this expansionary period, the doctrine was significantly contracted. The contraction of the doctrine, as it relates to contractors of the Federal Government and their activities, will be covered in this
subpart.
The judicial constriction of the federal immunity doctrine began in
1937 with theJames v. Dravo Contractig Co. 29 decision and has generally con30
But,
tinued to date as evidenced by recent Supreme Court decisions.
"[e]ven the Court's post-James decisions . . . cannot be set in an entirely
unwaivering line." 31 The "post-James decisions" referred to by the Court in
New Mexico will be examined in this subpart. These decisions can be profitably divided into two groups according to the nature of the tax involved:
(1) those concerning other than possessory use taxes; 32 and (2) those concern25. Id at 221.
26. Id at 223.
27. Id
28. Id at 225.
29. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
30. 455 U.S. 720; Washington v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 1344 (1983).
31. 455 U.S. at 732.
32. Other than possessory use taxes is meant to encompass all other taxes, but in this paper
it principally concerns gross receipts, sales and compensating use taxes. Although the definition
of these taxes may vary from state to state, the model state legislation suggested by the Multistate Tax Commission provides generally accepted definitions. In this regard, Article II of the
model legislation provides in part:
6. "Gross receipts tax" means a tax, other than a sales tax, which is imposed on or
measured by the gross volume of business, in terms of gross receipts or in other
terms, and in the determination of which no deduction is allowed which would
constitute the tax an income tax.
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ing possessory use taxes. 3 3 Each group will be treated separately below. A
separate section will also be devoted to the development of the legal incidence test and the issue of discrimination.
1.

Other Than Possessory Use Taxes

TheJames case was a landmark decision which marked the end of an
expansionary period spanning more than a century and the beginning of a
period of contraction that has carried the Court to the present day. The case
involved a West Virginia gross receipts tax on the privilege of conducting
business within the State. 34 The taxpayer, an independent contractor constructing locks and dams for the Government, argued that the tax as applied
to these activities was an unconstitutional interference with the Government's activities.3 5 In sustaining the tax, the closely divided James Court
noted by way of comparison the various debilitating characteristics of the
taxes which the Court had scrutinized before.3 6 In this context, the Court
stated: "The tax is not laid upon the Government [or] its property . . . [; it]
is not laid upon an instrumentality of the Government . . . [; it] is non' 37
discriminatory [; and it] is not laid upon the contract of the Government.
And, notwithstanding the Court's assumption that the tax in issue might be
an economic burden to the Government, the Court would not invalidate the
tax.38 Instead, the Court, after making an effort to distinguish and limit its
prior decisions in the area, concluded that "the West Virginia tax . . . does
not interfere in any substantial way with the performance of federal func7.

"Sales tax" means a tax imposed with respect to the transfer for a consideration of
ownership, possession or custody of tangible personal property or the rendering of
services measured by the price of the tangible personal property transferred or
services rendered and which is required by State or local law to be separately
stated from the sales price, but does not include a tax imposed exclusively on the
sale of a specifically identified commodity or article or class of commodities or
articles.
8. "[Compensating] use tax" means a nonrecurring tax, other than a sales tax, which
(a) is imposed on or with respect to the exercise or enjoyment of any right or
power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership, possession or
custody of that property or the leasing of that property from another including
any consumption, keeping, retention, or other use of tangible personal property
and (b) is complementary to a sales [or gross receipts] tax.
Multistate Tax Commission, Suggested State Legislation And Enabling Act Art. II.
33. In general, the possessory use tax, often referred to as a possessory interest tax, is assessed on the privilege of using or possessing tax-exempt property. It resembles an ad valorem
property tax assessed against the owner of the property. But, because the owner is exempt from
taxation, the tax is levied on the privilege of using the property and assessed against the nonexempt user. The distinction between an ad valorem property tax and a privilege or excise tax
measured by the value of that property, albeit formal, has been critically important to the
judicial review of these taxes. The possessory use tax is similar to an ad valorem property tax in
that it is a recurring tax which is often based on the fair market value of the underlying property. The possessory use tax is often confused with the compensating use tax which is a nonrecurring tax used to complement a sales or gross receipts tax. In this regard, the possessory use
tax is typically assessed annually and without regard to the payment of a sales or gross receipts
tax.
34. 302 U.S. at 138.
35. Id. at 149. The Federal Government, however, provided an amicus brief to the Court
supporting the State's contention that the tax was valid. Id.
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id at 160.
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39

In a strong dissent, Justice Roberts argued for the continued application
of the economic burdens test and objected that the Court was "overrul[ing],
sub silentio, a century of precedents." ' 40 After making a survey of the Court's
earlier decisions, Justice Roberts concluded that the tax was imposed upon
the Federal Government, and was therefore prohibited by M'Culloch v.
Mayland.4 1
The James case is important because it provided the foundation upon
which the legal incidence test would later be built, and marked the demise of
the economic burdens test that had theretofore prevailed. In this regard, the
following excerpt from James is instructive:
[I]t is not necessary to cripple the [state's authority to tax] by extending the constitutional exemption from taxation to those subjects which fall within the general application of nondiscriminatory laws, and where no direct burden is laid upon the
governmental instrumentality, and there is only a remote, 42
if any,
influence upon the exercise of the functions of government.
Thus, James held that a non-discriminatory tax would not be rejected on
federal immunity grounds unless it was laid directly upon the Government,
43
its instrumentalities, or a contract of the Government.
In Alabama v. King & Boozer, 4 4 the Court went a step further thanJames
and sustained a sales tax as applied to Government cost-plus contractors. In
King & Boozer, the taxpayer sold lumber to Government cost-plus contractors which were constructing an army camp for the Government. 4 5 The
Government argued that the legal incident of the tax was on the Govern46
ment, and therefore invalid.
In an unanimous decision, the Court expressly overruled the Panhandle
case and the economic burdens test expressed in that case. 47 In this regard,
the Court stated:
So far as such a non-discriminatory state tax upon the contractor
enters into the cost of the materials to the Government, that is but
a normal incident of the organization within the same territory of
two independent taxing sovereignties. The asserted right of the one
to be free of taxation by the other does not spell immunity from
paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who
furnish supplies to the Government and who have been granted no
48
tax immunity.
The Court adopted the Government's legal incidence test, but disagreed
with the Government's assertion that the incidence of the tax in issue was on
39. Id. at 161.
40. Id
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id at 185-86.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 149.
314 U.S. 1 (1941).
Id. at 6.
Id at 9.
Id For a discussion of the Panhandle case see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
Id at 8-9.
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the Government. 49 The Court concluded instead that the incidence of the
tax was upon the contractors, and the fact "that they were bound by their
contract to furnish the purchased material to the Government and entitled
to be reimbursed by it for the cost, including the tax," was of no event. 50
The King & Boozer decision is important because it sanctioned a tax
which was passed through in total to the Government. The tax went further
than theJames tax which was merely a possible or potential burden on the
Government; it was a clear and ascertainable economic burden on the Government. More importantly, the Court's focus in these cases shifted to the
legal formalisms such as the legal incidence of the tax and away from the
economic impact of the tax. The King & Boozer case suggested, however,
that the Federal Government might provide immunity to the contractor by
making the contractor its purchasing agent. 5 1 The Government, in KernLimerck, Inc. v. Scurlock, 52 seized upon this dicta and successfully argued that
a cost-plus contractor, under the terms of the contract, was merely a procurement agent of the Federal Government and therefore immune from state
and local taxation.
In Kern-Limerzck, with three judges dissenting, the Court held that a
sales tax had been unconstitutionally applied by the state to a contractor
who had purchased two diesel tractors for use in the construction of a Naval
ammunition depot. 5 3 The contract between the Government and the contractor clearly indicated that the contractor was acting as an agent for the
Government and that the Government, and not the contractor, was legally
obligated to the seller for the purchase of the two tractors.5 4 Furthermore,
title to all materials and supplies purchased by the contractor passed directly
to the Government. 55 Based on these considerations, the Court concluded
that the Government was the purchaser under the contract and, since the
56
legal incidence of the tax was on the purchaser, that the tax was invalid.
The dissenting Justices in Kern-Limerick argued that the "legal incidence" of a state tax is a question with constitutional implications which
should not be determined by the contract. 57 In this regard, the dissent was
displeased with the possibility that the mere alteration of a few words in the
49. Id. at 14.
50. Id.
51. Id at 13. There the Court stated:
But however extensively the Government may have reserved the right to restrict or
control the action of the contractors in other respects, neither the reservation nor the
exercise of that power gave to the contractors the status of agents of the Government
to enter into contracts or to pledge its credit.

52. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
53. Id at 111.
54. Id at 119-20.
55. Id.
56. Id at 122. Although the Government prevailed in the Supreme Court, the victory,
presumably because of political pressures, was short-lived for the Department of Defense
(DOD). In 1955, only one year after Kern-Limerck, DOD issued a policy statement to the effect
that the Kern-Lthmerick procurement agent concept should not be used to avoid otherwise validly
imposed state or local taxes. But, as indicated below, other federal agencies, most notably the
Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), continued to rely on the procurement agent concept.
57. Id at 126-27.
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contract could alter the constitutional line of demarcation. 5 The dissent
stated: "We should hold that, until the Congress says differently, the states
are free to tax all sales to cost-plus government contractors. ' 59 In other
words, the dissent would hold that the facts in Kern-Limerick provide no basis
for constitutionally implied immunity and, until Congress provides statutory
immunity, the states' authority to tax sales to cost-plus Government contractors should not be disturbed.
The statutory immunity referred to by the dissent in Kern-Limerick was
found by the Court in Carson v. Roane - Anderson Co. 60 In that case the State
of Tennessee imposed a sales and compensating use tax on certain Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) contractors. 6 ' The Government argued that the
contractors were immune from taxation pursuant to the statutory exemption
provided by section 9(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.62 That provision provides in pertinent part: "The Commission, and the property, activities, and income of the Commission, are hereby expressly exempted from
taxation in any manner or form by any state, county, municipality, or subdivision thereof."' 63 Based on this language and the legislative history, the
Court had little difficulty holding for the Government.
In reaching its decision the Court initially examined the nature of congressional power to create tax immunities. The power does not depend on
the nature of the agency or instrument doing the work for the Government,
but rather it "stems from the power to preserve and protect functions validly
authorized-the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the powers vested in the Congress." 64 Having determined
that Congress had the requisite authority, the Court then defined the scope
of the statutory provision in issue to include "all authorized methods of performing the governmental function."' 65 Accordingly, finding that Congress
was constitutionally empowered to create tax immunities and that the statute in issue was intended by Congress to immunize AEC contractors from
state and local taxation, the Court held that the contractors were immune
66
from such taxation.
Yielding to political pressure, however, Congress later repealed the statutory language upon which statutory immunity had been found in the Carson decision. 67 While the repeal resolved the question of statutory immunity
for AEC contractors, it did not resolve the question of constitutional
68
immunity.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id at 127.
60. 342 U.S. 232 (1952).

61. Id at 233.
62. 60 Stat. 765 (1946). The provision in issue was repealed by Act of August 13, 1953, 67
Stat. 575 c. 432.
63. Id.
64. 342 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted).
65. Id at 235-36.

66. Id. at 236.
67.

Act of August 13, 1953, 67 Stat. 575, c. 432.

68. See United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), ad per curiam, 364
U.S. 281 (1960); United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964). In these cases the Court noted that
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The Court in United Slates v. Livingston 69 affirmed without opinion a
lower court finding of constitutional immunity for an AEC contractor. In
Livingston, the State of South Carolina sought to impose its sales and com70
pensating use tax upon the purchases of materials by an AEC contractor.
The contractor was paid cost and a nominal fee of one dollar to design,
construct and operate an atomic energy plant for the AEC. 7 ' The contract
contained a title vesting provision whereby title to materials purchased
under the contract would pass directly from the vendor to the Government. 72 To facilitate and expedite payment, the contract provided for a re73
volving fund to be deposited for the payment of purchases and expenses.
Finding that the contractor was an agent of the Government by implication,
and citing the Kern-Limerick decision, the lower court concluded that the contractor's "procurement activities resulted in the sale of goods and services to
the United States, that the purchases were those of the United States and
immune from ordinary sales and use taxes upon the purchaser or upon the
purchasing agent."' 74 With respect to the issue of the contractor's beneficial
use of the property purchased, the court made a factual determination that
75
there were no benefits, profit or otherwise, to the contractor.
The Court, however, did not find constitutional immunity in the next
case concerning AEC contractors-United States v. Boyd. 76 In Boyd, the State
of Tennessee collected from certain AEC contractors a sales and compensating use tax upon purchases made by them under their contracts with the
AEC. 77 The Tennessee Supreme Court, relying on Kern-Limerick, determined that the contractors were merely acting as procurement agents on the
Government's behalf and refused to sustain the State's application of the
sales tax. 78 That court, however, sustained the collection of the compensating use tax, 79 the only issue which reached the Supreme Court.8 0
The Court, like the Tennessee Supreme Court, sustained the state's collection of the compensating use tax. In sustaining the tax, the Court initially
summarized the state of the law with the following passage:
The Constitution immunizes the [United States from] taxation
repeal of the language providing statutory immunity was only intended to place AEC contractors on an equal footing with other Government contractors.
69. United States v. Livingston, 179 F.Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), adpercuriam, 364 U.S.
281 (1960).
70. 179 F.Supp. at 11.
71. Id at 16.
72. Id

at 17.

73. Id.
74. Id at 22 (citations omitted).
75. Id at 22-23. The Court distinguished the Delrott cases, discussed in a, where the contractors used the property in their profit-making capacity. The Court also rejected the State's
argument that the contractor was benefitted by the valuable experience received by its employees. Then the Court noted: "There is every indication that [the contractor] accepted this contract and its obligations out of the high sense of public responsibility, despite deprivation, which
its president expressed to its stockholders in 1950." Id at 23.
76. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
77. Id at 43.
78. Id at 43 n.5.
79. Id. at 43.
80. Id at 43 n.5.
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by the States, . . .but it does not forbid a tax whose legal incidence is upon a contractor doing business with the United States,
even though the economic burden of the tax, by contract or otherwise, is ultimately borne by the United States. . . . Nor is it forbidden for a State to tax the beneficial use by a federal contractor
of property owned by the United States, even though the tax is
measured by the value of the Government's property, . . . and
even though his contract is for goods or services for the United
States. . . . The use by the contractor for his own private endsin connection with commercial activities carried on for profit-is a
separate and distinct taxable activity.8 1
Then, noting that the Government had accepted these principles, the Court
rejected the Government's contention that the contractors had not used the
Government property for their own commercial advantage but exclusively
for the benefit of the United States.8 2 The Court found this contention "incredible. '" 3 The critical factor is that the contractors used the property for
84
their own commercial, profit-making activities.
In Boyd the Government urged that the work done by the contractors
"should be viewed as though the Commission was doing its own work
through its own employees, the legal incidence of the tax therefore falling on
it." 8" The Court, however, would not indulge in this fiction. 8 6 The Government may perform its functions either "directly through its own facilities,
personnel and staff," or with the assistance of private enterprise.8 7 The Government is well aware of these possibilities and in this case it chose the latter.88 "We cannot conclude that [the contractors], both cost-plus contractors
for profit, have been so incorporated into the Government structure as to
become instrumentalities of the United States and thus enjoy governmental
'
immunity.' 89
2.

Possessory Use Taxes

At this juncture a brief word about possessory use taxes and two related
taxes-the ad valorem general property tax and the compensating use taxis appropriate.
The "old and widely used ad valorem general property tax" was discussed in detail by the Court in United States v. County of Allegheny. 9° In that
81. Id.at 44.
82. Id. at 44.
83. Id
84. The Boyd Court noted that reliance by the Government on the Livingston case was
misplaced. In Livingston, the lower court had made a factual determination that the contractor
received no benefits from the contract. In this regard, the facts in Boyd make it clearly distinguishable as the contractor's receive a substantial fee in the course of their commercial operations. Id at 45 n.6.
85. Id at 46-47.
86. Id at 48.
87. Id. at 47.
88. Id. at 48.
89. Id
90. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
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case, the Court described the ad valorem general property tax scheme as
follows:
This taxation plan involves the identification and valuation of the
variable individual holdings to be taxed, commonly called the assessment, the application of a uniform rate calculated on the need
for public revenues, and the collection, in default of payment, by
distraint and sale of the property assessed and taxed. . . . While
personal liability for the tax may be and sometimes is imposed, the
power to tax is predicated upon jurisdiction of the property, not
upon jurisdiction of the person of the owner, which often is lacking
without impairment of the power to tax. In both theory and practice the property is the subject of the tax and stands as security for
its payment. 9 '
These property taxes are typically assessed annually. The compensating
use tax92 is usually complementary to either a sales or gross receipts tax.
Like the sales or gross receipts tax it is a nonrecurring tax. Unlike those
taxes, however, the subject of the tax is the use or enjoyment of the property
rather than the sales transaction over which the state may lack taxing
authority.
The possessory use tax 9 3 is seemingly the result of cross-breeding between the ad valorem general property tax and the compensating use tax. It
is similar to the ad valorem general property tax in that it is typically measured by the fair market value of the property and assessed on a recurring
basis. It is like the compensating use tax in that the subject of the tax is the
use or enjoyment of the property rather than the property itself. The possessory use tax is like the compensating use tax in that it is complementary to
the ad valorem general property tax. It complements the ad valorem general property tax by reaching some of the property that is otherwise exempt
from that tax, vtz., Government property used by private contractors.
91. Id. at 184.
92. See supra note 32.
93. The Court first reviewed the possessory use tax in United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S.
466 (1958). The tax statute was quoted by the Court as set forth in the passage below. It is
representative of the tax statutes that have followed.
An Act to provide for the taxation of lessees and users of tax-exempt property.
Section 1. When any real property which for any reason is exempt from taxation
is leased, loaned or otherwise made available to and used by a private individual,
association or corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit, except
where the use is by way of a concession in or relative to the use of a public airport,
park, market, fair ground or similar property which is available to the use of the general public [sic], shall be subject to taxation in the same amount and to the same
extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of such property: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall not apply to federal property for which payments are
made in lieu of taxes in amounts equivalent to taxes which might otherwise be lawfully assessed or property of any state-supported educational institution.
Section 2. Taxes shall be assessed to such lessees or users of real property and
collected in the same manner as taxes assessed to owners of real property, except that
such taxes shall not become a lien against the property. When due, such taxes shall
constitute a debt due from the lessee or user to the township, city, village, county and
school district for which the taxes were assessed and shall be recoverable by direct
action of assumpsit.
355 U.S. at 467 n.l.
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In Allegheny, the Court was faced with an assessment by a local taxing
authority which, under what the Court described as an ad valorem general
property tax, sought to tax the full value of Government-owned machinery
located on the taxpayer's facilities for use in performance of its contracts
with the Government.9 4 Notwithstanding state law, 95 the Court determined
that title to the machinery was in the Government and that in substance the
tax was on the property owned by the Government. 9 6 The Court recognized
that the contractor had some legal and beneficial interest in the Government's property.9 7 The assessment, however, did not segregate the contractor's limited interest in the property. 98 On this basis, the Court rejected the
tax as unconstitutional holding "that Government-owned property, to the
full extent of the Government's interest, therein, is immune from taxation,
either as against the Government itself or as against one who holds it as a
bailee." 99 But the Court saved for another day the question of whether a
contractor's limited interest might be taxed by appropriate proceedings. 0 0
This question was addressed by the Court in 1958 in three companion cases:
United States v.City of Detroit (Detroit),lO' United States v. Township of Muskegon
(Muskegon) ,102 and City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. (Murray). 103 Except for a
few factual differences, the Detroit and Muskegon cases were substantially the
same and presented the same basic questions. The contractor in Detroit
leased Government property for his private business.10 4 The contractor in
Muskegon used the Government's property under a permit in the perform0 5
ance of his contracts with the Government.1
In Detroit, with two dissenting, the Court sustained the possessory use
tax' 06 which was imposed on the contractor and measured by the value of
the tax-exempt property in issue.' 0 7 In doing so the Court rejected the Government's argument "that since the tax is measured by the value of the property used it should be treated as nothing but a contrivance to lay a tax on the
property."' 1 8 In this regard, the Court noted "that it may be permissible for
a state to measure a tax imposed on a valid subject of state taxation by
taking into account Government property which is itself tax-exempt."' 1 9 It
was on this basis that the Court distinguished Allegheny where the subject of
94. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
95. In the face of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision to sustain the tax, the Court
set out its authority as the final arbiter in matters concerning federal rights as follows: "Where a
federal right is concerned we are not bound by the characterization given to a state tax by state
courts or legislatures, or relieved by it from the duty of considering the real nature of the tax
and its effect upon the federal right asserted." Id at 184.
96. Id at 181-86.
97. Id at 186.
98. Id. at 187.
99. Id. at 189.
100. Id at 186.
101. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
102. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
103. 355 U.S. 493 (1958).

104. 355 U.S. at 486.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 93.
107. 355 U.S. at 468.
108. Id.at 470.
109. Id. at 471.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:4

the tax was the Government's property. I 10 Noting that all users of tax-exempt property were treated the same and that there were several organizations with tax-exempt property, the court determined that "[t]he class
defined is not an arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory one."' t
To Justice Whittaker, however, the majority's position was a victory of
form and label over substance.' 1 2 The Justice was convinced that it was
"crystal clear" that the tax was a "direct imposition upon the Government's
property interests."' 13 In the dissent's view, relying on Allegheny, the states
were constitutionally prohibited from taxing the entire value of Government-owned property." 14 Instead, the States must segregate the private in15
terest and tax only that interest.
In a shorter opinion, the Court concluded that Muskegon was controlled
by the same principles at work in Detroit." 6 The Court referred to the distinction between a lease and a permit as insubstantial." 7 With respect to
the fact that the property was being used in the performance of a Government contract, the Court stated that if the Government had retained control
over the contractor's activities and financial gains, so that the contractor
could properly be called a "servant" of the United States, the tax might not
have attached.'" 8 Notwithstanding this potential distinction for private parties which were excessively controlled by the Government, the Court sustained the tax, finding that the contractor was using the property in
connection with its own commercial activities." 19
Over the dissent of four Justices, the Court in Murray sustained a different tax scheme than that examined by the Court in Detroit and Muskegon.
The statutory provisions in Murray provided in pertinent part: "The owners
or persons in possession of personal property shall pay all taxes assessed
thereon."' 2 0 The Court rejected Murray's argument that the tax, like the
tax in Allegheny, was an ad valorem property tax.' 2 ' In this context, the
Court declared that it was concerned only with the "practical operation" of
the tax and not "empty formalisms."' 122 Then, the Court concluded that the
tax in Murray and in Detroit and Muskegon were substantially the same: "We
see no essential difference so far as constitutional tax immunity is concerned
110. Id.
Ill.
Id at 473.
112. Id at 478.
113. Id.
114. Id at 480-83.
115. Id
116. 355 U.S. at 484-85.
117. Id at 486. The Court's reference to form over substance is anomolous considering the
fact that under the Detroit and Muskegon cases the constitutional viability of a tax depends almost entirely on the craft of the statutory draftsman. Under these cases a tax measured by the
value of Government-owned property would be sustained if "on the use of" the property but
rejected if on the property itself. Accordingly, procedurally different taxes with the same economic impact on the Government might yield different constitutional determinations. Certainly this is not a distinction with economic substance. Id.
118.

Id.

119. Id.
120. 355 U.S. at 489, 491 n.L
121. Id. at 492-93.
122. Id at 493-94.
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between taxing a person for using property he possesses and taxing him for
possessing property he uses when in both instances he uses the property for
123
his own private ends."'
The Court distinguished Murray from Allegheny on two grounds: (1) the
state law in Murray specifically authorized assessment against the person in
possession; and (2) the "taxing authorities [in Murray] were careful not to
attempt to tax the Government's interest in the property."'' 24 Although the
Court could not find any constitutional limitations on the tax in issue, it
reminded the Government that Congress should make the policy decisions,
determining whether and to what extent private parties doing business with
the Government are immune from state taxes.' 2 5 The dissent, however,
finding that the title to the property in question was vested in the Government,126 and that the tax was nothing more than an ad valorem tax on the
property of the Government, 127 found Allegheny "entirely controlling.' 1 28
Although the Michigan trilogy of cases concerned the use of tax-exempt
property by a business for profit, in United States v. County of Fresno,'129 the
Court determined that the principles enunciated in the Michigan cases were
equally applicable where the tax-exempt property was put to a beneficial
personal use.130 The tax in Fresno was imposed on users of "nontaxable publicly owned real property."' 3 ' Unlike Allegheny, the measure of the tax was
only on the portion of the total value of property attributable to the users
interest.' 32 After finding that the legal incidence of the tax in Fresno was not
123. Id at 493.
124. Id at 494. The Murray case cast considerable doubt on the precedential value of Allegheny. In this context, the Court stated:
Petitioners on the other hand contend that the decision in Allegheny is inconsistent with
the general trend of our decisions in this field, that it has already been distinguished to
the point where it retains no meaningful vitality and that it is erroneous. However
that may be, we do not think that case is controlling, essentially for the reasons set
forth in United States v. Detroit ....
Id
And, Justice Harlan in dissent noted:
Although the Court here purports to distinguish Allegheny, it seems to me that the
authority of that case has now been reduced almost to the vanishing point, for neither
the tax statute here nor that in Allegheny qualified application of the tax to property
employed in private commercial activity.
Id. at 508-09 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. Id at 495.
126. Id at 514-24.
127. Id at 524-30.
128. Id at 530-33.
129. 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
130. Id at 467.
131. Id at 455 n.3.
132. Id. at 466. With respect to the precedential value of Allegheny and the distinguishing
characteristics of the tax in Fresno, the Court noted:
Insofar as United States v. Allegheny County . . . holds that a tax measured by the
value of government-owned property may never be imposed on a private party who is
using it, that decision has been overruled by United States v. City ofDetroit . . . and its
companion cases. . . . Insofar as it stands for the proposition that Government property used by a private citizen may not be taxed at its full value where contractual
restrictions on its use for the Government's benefit render the property less valuable to
the user, the case has no application here. Appellee counties have sought to tax only
the individual appellants' interests in the Forest Service houses and have reduced their
assessments to take account of the limitations on the use of the houses imposed by the
Government.
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on the Government, the Court focused on the issue of whether the tax was
discriminatory as to the Government or its employees. 133 The Court concluded that the tax was not discriminatory and sustained the tax on constitu34
tional grounds. 1
3.

Legal Incidence and Discrimination

A review of the cases discussed above in this subpart reveals a fairly
consistent approach used by the Court in determining the constitutional validity of the various tax schemes. Initially, the Court determines whether the
legal incidence of the tax falls on the Government or its instrumentalities. If
necessary, the Court then examines the question of whether the tax discriminates against the Government or those with whom it deals.
Although the Court often refers to the legal incidence test as though its
meaning were self-evident, it has on occasion considered in detail different
aspects of the test. In particular, the Court has noted certain factors to be
considered in applying the test and considered whether state or federal law
should be applied in determining the legal incidence question. The primary
factor considered by the Court in its determination of legal incidence is legislative intent.' 35 More precisely, the Court considers legislative intent with
respect to the intended payor of the tax and not with respect to legal liability
for the tax.1 36 Generally the legal incidence will be on "the statutorily designated taxpayer from whom the tax is to be collected, unless it is clearly directed that the tax is to be passed on to another."' 37 In this regard, in Uni'ted
States o. M'ss'sst'ppi, the Court held that when a "[sitate requires that its sales
tax be passed on to the purchaser and be collected by the vendor from him,
this establishes as a matter of law that the legal incidence of the tax falls
upon the purchaser."' 38 The court, in Gurley v. Rhoden, 139 made it clear that
while the economic burden of a tax incident to the sale of goods is typically
shifted to the purchaser, that fact alone is of little consequence to a determination of legal incidence. Although the economic burden of a tax is traditionally shifted to the purchaser, that fact does not mean that the legal
incidence of the tax is on the purchaser, unless, as a matter of law, the eco40
nomic burden must be passed on to the purchaser.'
Even if a tax passes the legal incidence test, it may be rejected as discriminatory. As the Court in United States v. City of Detroit' stated: "A tax
may be invalid even though it does not fall directly on the United States if it
operates so as to discriminate against the Government or those with whom it
deals." 4 ' The question then becomes what is discriminatory in this context.
Id. at 462 n.10.
133. Id. at 464-68.
notes 142-44
134. Id. For a discussion of the discrimination aspects of the Fresno case see infra
and accompanying text.
135. United States v. Tax Comm'n, Mississippi, 421 U.S. 599 (1975).
136. Id. at 607, citing
First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
137. Hartman, supra note 9, §6:17, at 328 (1981).
138. 421 U.S. 599, at 608.

139. 421 U.S. 200 (1975).
140. Id.at 204.
141. 355 U.S. 466, at 473 (1958).
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While the Court has answered this question on an adhoc basis, some general
principles have been established. The basic rule in this area, stated by the
Court in UnitedStates v. Couno of Fresno, is that the burden placed on a federal
function by a state tax imposed on a federal contractor is not unconstitutional so long as it is imposed equally on others similarly situated. 142 This
does not mean that all similarly situated parties must be treated in precisely
the same manner; 14 3 it does mean, however, that the states may not impose a
heavier tax burden on those dealing with the Federal Government than
others similarly situated.' 44 It apparently also means that the states may not
impose a heavier burden on those dealing with governmental or public concerns than on similarly situated parties dealing with the private sector.
The underpinning for the principles concerning discriminatory taxation
was summarized by the dissent in Montana v. United States 145 as follows:
There is good reason to insist that a state tax be "imposed equally"
on all "similarly situated constituents of the state" . . . whether
connected with the public sector or private. Broad application of a
tax is necessary to guarantee an efficacious "political check" on potentially abusive taxation. The Montana gross receipts tax, limited
as it is to public sector contractors, provides little such assurance.
Taxation of contractors dealing directly with the State or state
agencies affords no safeguard against discriminatory treatment of
federal contracting agencies and the contractors with whom they
deal. Any tax increase passed along by a contractor would be
borne fully by a federal agency but would be offset by the correof the State; from the State's
sponding tax revenues in the case
1 46
perspective the tax is a washout.
It is for these reasons that a discriminatory tax on the Federal Government
or those with whom it deals must be rejected on constitutional grounds.
II.

RECENT DECISIONS

Part II is a survey of recent decisions in the federal immunity area
142.

429 U.S. 462 (1977).

143. See 355 U.S. 466, at 473; 429 U.S. 452, at 462-65.
144. See Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960);
Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961).
145. 440 U.S. 147, 164 (1979). In this regard, the dissent was of the opinion that the imposition of Montana's one percent gross receipts tax upon contractors of public, but not private,
construction projects was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. In support of his position, Justice White stated:
In any event, ! see no basis whatsoever for extracting from the principle that a State
may not favor itself over the Federal Government the further proposition that a State
may favor its private-sector constituents so long as contractors working for public bodies are taxed. Indeed, in Fresno the Court sustained the tax only after assuring itself
that persons who rented federal property were "no worse off under California tax laws
than those who work for private employers and rent houses in the private sector."...
Such laws, reaching broadly across the public and private sectors, are characteristic of
those this Court has sustained.
Id. at 170. While this is only the dissent of one justice, Justice White, it is persuasive because
Justice White was the author of Fresno, and because the majority's decision in Montana did not
address the Supremacy Clause issue but was decided on the grounds of collateral estoppel. Id
at 147, 164.
146. Id. at 170-71.
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which are of considerable importance in the Government procurement
arena. The decisions to be covered, in order of their discussion below, are
United States v. New Mexico, "' Washington v. United States 148 and UnitedStates v.
Colorado. 149 The first two cases involve gross receipts and sales tax schemes,
respectively, and the last case involves a possessory use tax.
A.

United States v. New Mexico-FederalImmunity of Government Contractors
Based On An Agency Relationship Between The Government and Its
Contractors

The linchpin of the federal immunity doctrine is that the states cannot,
1 50
Fedwithout permission, levy a tax directly on the Federal Government.
eral immunity in its present form, however, is not conferred merely because
15 1
This is true even
the tax has an economic impact on the Government.
152
By virtue of
when the Government bears the entire burden of the tax.
these rules, Government contractors are not immune from state taxation regardless of where the economic burden falls. Nonetheless, when the contractor is "so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot
realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity be53
ing taxed is concerned," tax immunity may be appropriate. 1 The question
thus becomes under what circumstances are the contractor and the Government so closely related as to provide for the unity described above. This was
the issue confronting the Court in United States v. New Mexico, an issue which
is largely dependent on the substantive contractual relationship between the
54
parties.'
Before commenting on the specific contractual arrangements, the New
Mexico Court made some general observations about the contracts in issue.' 55 The Court noted that the Department of Energy (DOE) contracts in
issue, contracts for the management of Government-owned research and de147. 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
148. 103 S.Ct. 1344 (1983).
149. 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980),summariya~fdsubnom Jefferson County v. United States,
450 U.S. 901 (1981).
150. 455 U.S. at 733, cing Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943).
151. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. 455 U.S. at 735.
154. Id at 722-27.
155. Id. The Court also discussed the distinguishing characteristics of the three contractors
and their contracts with the Government. First, the Sandia Corporation-a subsidiary of Western Electric Company, Inc-engages exclusively in Government-sponsored research; is reimbursed for its costs but receives no fee under its contract; and owns no property except for an
amount constituting its paid-in capital. Second, the ZIA Company-a subsidiary of Santa Fe
Industries, Inc-provides services to both the Government and to the private sector; receives its
costs and a fixed fee for its Government work; and owns property used primarily in the performance of its nongovernment work. Third, Los Alamos Constructors, Inc-a subsidiary of ZIAengages exclusively in Government efforts; owns no tangible personal property; and is reimbursed for costs and receives a fixed fee. While the Court did not view the distinguishing characteristics as sufficient to yield different results, it found it more difficult to distinguish Sandia's
situation from the Livingston decision wherein the contractor, like Sandia, received no fee. Id at
724, 740 nn. 3, 13. For a discussion of the Livingston case see supra notes 69-75 and accompanying
text.
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velopment facilities, were a unique species of Government contracts.' 56 Because of the complexity of the contractual relationship, the Court observed
that it was virtually impossible to apply traditional agency rules. 157 With
regard to the degree of Government control over the contractors, the Court
stated: "While subject to the general direction of the Government, the contractors are vested with substantial autonomy in their operations and pro158
curement practices."'
Having set the tone, the Court then proceeded to discuss some of the
more salient factors concerning the contracts in issue. 159 On the one hand,
the Court noted that the contract provided that title to all tangible personal
property purchased by the contractors passed directly from the vendor to the
Government and that the Government was to bear the risk of loss for property procured by the contractors. The contract also provided for Government control over the disposition of all Government-owned property and,
most importantly, for an advance funding procedure whereby the Government provided funds in advance of contract performance to meet contractor
costs.' 6° These factors, of course, are indicative of a close connection between the Government and the contractors; they portray the contractors as
mere agents of the Government. On the other hand, the Court listed the
following factors indicative of a more casual relationship: the contractors
held themselves out to third-party suppliers as the buyer; the Government
disclaimed liability for acts committed by the contractors' employees; and
the contractors' employees have no direct claim against the Government for
labor-related grievances.' 6 1 The Court then noted that the contracts had
been amended two years after the commencement of litigation to provide
62
that the contractors were agents of the Government for certain purposes.1
The taxes at issue in the New Mexico case were the New Mexico gross
receipts and compensating use taxes.16 3 The subject of the gross receipts tax
is the privilege of engaging in business in New Mexico; its measure is a percentage of gross receipts.' 64 The subject of the compensating use tax is the
use of property in New Mexico; it only reaches property not previously subject to the gross receipts tax; and it is equivalent in amount to the gross
receipts tax that would have been imposed.' 6 5 The "receipts of the United
156. Id
157. Id

at 723.

158. Id
159. Id. at 723-27.
160. Id at 724-26.
161. Id at 725.
162. Id at 726-27. With some cynicism, the Court observed: "At the same time, however,
the United States denied any intent 'formally and directly [to] designat[e] the contractors as
agents,'. . . and each modification stated that it did not 'create rights or obligations not otherwise provided for in the contract.'" Id at 727. The Government's ambivalence toward the
contractors was important in the Court's eyes. The court was not impressed by the Government's selective approach concerning the agency status of the contractor.
163. Id. at 727. For a general description of the gross receipts and compensating use taxes
see supra note 33.
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-4 (Supp. 1975),amendedby N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4 (Supp.
1981).
165. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-7 (Supp. 1975),amenddby N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7 (Supp.
1981).
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States or any agency or any instrumentality thereof" and "the use of property by the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof" are exempt from the gross receipts and compensating use taxes, respectively.' 66 A
deduction from gross receipts is allowed for receipts from the sale of tangible
67
personal property to the United States. '
Unable to convince the state that the contractors were constitutionally
immune from state taxation, the United States initiated suit in the District
Court requesting a declaratory judgment that (1) the use of Governmentowned property by the contractors was not subject to the state's compensating use tax; (2) advanced funds used for Government operations under the
contracts were not taxable gross receipts to the contractors; and (3) receipts
of vendors selling tangible property to the Government, through its management contractors, could not be taxed by the state.1 68 The District Court,
granting summary judgment for the Government, determined that an
agency relationship existed and that the contractors were immune from state
taxation.1 69 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the contractor's were sufficiently independent of the Government to
justify the imposition of the New Mexico taxes and directing the District
Court to enter summary judgment for the State.' 70 The United States
17
sought and was granted certiorari. '
In an unanimous decision the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit. The Court, noting that the Government had conceded that the legal
incidence of the taxes was on the contractors, focused on the decisive issue of
"whether the contractors can realistically be considered entities independent
of the United States."' 72 Having focused on the pivotal issue the Court then
proceeded to address the specific issues raised by the Government.
First, relying on United States v. Boyd,' 7 3 the Court upheld the State's
application of its use tax.174 After finding that "[tihe tax, the taxed activity,
and the contractual relationships" in New Mexico did not differ from those in
Boyd,' 75 the Court, as in Boyd, concluded that "the contractors remained
distinct entities pursuing 'private ends,' and that their actions remained
commercial activities carried on for profit."' 76 Stressing the independent
nature of the contractors, the Court stated:
166. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-12.1 (Supp. 1975), amendedby N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-13
(Supp. 1981); and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-16A-12.2 (Supp. 1975), amended by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 79-14 (Supp. 1981).
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-14.9 (Supp. 1975), amended by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-54

(Supp. 1981).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

455 U.S. at 728.
Id at 728-29, citing
455 U.S. at 429-30,
624 F.2d II1 (10th
455 U.S. at 738.
Id at 738-40. For a

455 F. Supp. 993, 997 (D.N.M. 1978).
citing 624 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1980).
Cir. 1980), cert.
granted 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
discussion of the Boyd case see supra notes 76-89 and accompanying

text.
174.
175.
176.
Sandia,
benefits

Id at 738-41.
Id at 740.
Id at 739 (citing United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, at 44 (1964)). With respect to
however, the Court stated: "Sandia does not receive a cash fee, but it obtains obvious
from itscontractual relationships." Id at 740 n. 13.
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It is true, of course, that employees are a special type of agent, and
like the contractors here employees are paid for their services. But
the differences between an employee and one of these contractors
are crucial. The congruence of professional interests between the
contractors and the Federal Government is not complete; their rehave been created for limited and
lationships with the Government
77
carefully defined purposes.1
Based on these considerations, the Court held that the state's application of
178
its use tax was not constitutionally offensive.
Having already determined that the contractors were independent taxable entities in its discussion of the use tax, the Court addressed the Government's contention that the gross receipts tax had been improperly applied to
the advanced funds used by the contractors to meet salaries and internal
costs. 179 On this issue, noting the independent nature of the contractors and
citingjames v. Dravo Contracting Co. ,180 the Court had little difficulty holding
for the State.18'
Finally, with greater difficulty, the Court concluded that the state had
properly applied its gross receipts tax to sales from other vendors to the contractors in issue.1 8 2 On this point the Government had argued that the contractors were procurement agents of the Government under Kern-Limerick v.
Scurlock. 8 3 The Government argued, as in the Kern-Limerick case, that the
receipts of vendors selling tangible property to the contractors could not be
taxed by the state. 184 In passing on this issue, the Court carefully distinguished it from the other two issues by pointing out that a procurement
agent can be so closely related to the government that his activity is, in essence, a sale to the government.' 8 5 Observing that this was the Court's conclusion in Kern-Limerzck ,186 the Court then proceeded to highlight the factual
18 7
differences between Kern-Limerick and the instant case.
In Kern-Limerick the contractor identified itself as a federal procurement
agent; title to property purchased by the contractor passed directly to the
Government; the purchase orders declared that the purchase was made by
the Government; the Government, not the contractor, was liable for the
177. Id. at 740-41.
178. Id. at 741. In passing, citing two possessory use tax cases, Murray and Colorado, the
Court noted: "While a use tax may be valid only to the extent that it reaches the contractor's
interest in government-owned property, . . . there has been no suggestion here that the contractors are being taxed beyond the value of their use." Id at 741 n. 14. By this passage the Court
has unnecessarily obscured the inherently different characteristics of possessory use and compensating use taxes. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
179. Id at 741.
180. 302 U.S. 134 (1937). For a discussion of thejames decision see supra notes 34-43 and
accompanying text.
181. 455 U.S. at 741. In passing, the Court compared the use of Government-owned property and advanced funding as follows: "In any event, [the use of advance funding] to achieve
contractual ends is not significantly different from using property for the same purpose." Id
182. Id at 741-43.
183. 347 U.S. 110 (1954). For a discussion ofKern-Limneric seesupra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
184. 455 U.S. at 741-43.
185. Id at 742.
186. Id
187. Id. at 742-43.
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purchase price; specific Government approval was required for each transaction; and the statutory procurement scheme envisioned the use of federal
purchasing agents. 188 The New Mexico case is different from Kern-Limerick in
the following respects: the contractors made purchases in their own names;
there was no formal intention to denominate the contractors as purchasing
agents; and two of the three contractors were not required to obtain advance
Government approval for purchases. 189 These factors, the Court concluded,
"demonstrate that the contractors have a substantial independent role in
making purchases, and that the identity of interests between the Government and the contractors is far from complete."' t
Moreover, the Court
continued, the fact that title passes directly to the Government from the
vendor is not in itself sufficient to immunize the Government from
taxation. 19 1
Although not necessary to its holding in New Mexico, the Court made
two noteworthy points concerning federal immunity under the Constitution.
First, the Court expressed a lack of enthusiasm for the Government's attempt
to confer immunity with cosmetic contractual provisions drafted by Government functionaries. 192 Second, while holding that the Constitution did not
immunize the contractors in New Mexico, the Court invited the agencies to
193
seek legislation expanding federal immunity.
188. Id.
189. Id
190. Id at 743.
191. Id
192. Id at 737. On this point, the Court expressed its views as follows:
Granting tax immunity only to entities that have been "incorporated into the Government structure" can forestall, at least to a degree, some of the manipulation and
wooden formalism that occasionally have marked tax litigation-and that have no
proper place in determining the allocation of power between co-existing sovereignties.
In this case, for example, the Government and its contractors modified their agreements two years into the litigation in an obvious attempt to strengthen the case for
nonliability. Yet the Government resists using its own employees for the tasks at
hand-or, indeed, even formally designating Sandia, Zia, and LACI as agents-because it seeks to tap the expertise of industry, without subjecting its contractors to
burdensome federal procurement regulations. . . .Instead, the Government earnestly
argues that its contractors are entitled to tax immunity because, among other things,
they draw checks directly on federal funds, instead of waiting a time for reimbursement. . . .We cannot believe that an immunity of constitutional stature rests on such
technical considerations, for that approach allows "any government functionary to
draw the constitutional line by changing a few words in a contract." Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. at 126 (dissentingopinion). [emphasis added].
Id.
193. Id at 737-38, 743-44. In this regard, the Court stated:
[I]t is Congress that must take responsibility for the decision, by so expressly providing
as respects contracts in a particular form, or contracts under particular programs ...
And this allocation of responsibility is wholly appropriate, for the political process is
"uniquely adapted to accommodating the competing demands" in this area .... But
absent congressional action, we have emphasized that the States' power to tax can be
denied only under "the clearest constitutional mandate."
Id at 737-38. And, the court observed in conclusion:
[lit is worth remarking that DOE is asking us to establish as a constitutional rule
something that it was unable to obtain statutorily from Congress. For the reasons set
out above, we conclude that the contractors here are not protected by the Constitution's guarantee of federal supremacy. If political or economic considerations suggest
that a broader immunity rule is appropriate, "[s]uch complex problems are ones which
Congress is best qualified to resolve."
Id. at 744.
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Washington v. United States-FederalImmunity and Discrmnation
Against Federal Contractors

The question of constitutional immunity of the United States from state
and local taxation has evolved over the years into a two-tiered analysis.' 94
First, without the consent of the United States, the legal incidence of a tax
may not be placed on the United States. This is the underpinning of federal
immunity; it is the test for determining whether a tax is directly on the
United States.1 95 Second, even though the legal incidence of a tax is not on
the United States, the tax may not discriminate against the United States or
those with whom it deals.19 6 This is a necessary corollary to the technical
legal incidence test. It is the second part of the two-tiered analysis that was
197
the focal point of the Court's recent decision in Washington v. United States.
Before considering the Washington case, it is useful to note that the concept of tax discrimination does not carry a universal meaning. Even within
the confines of the United States Constitution the tax discrimination concept
has many different faces. For instance, the Court has held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution prohibits the states from invidiously
discriminating between different classes of taxpayers.' 9 8 This principle is
distinguishable from the federal immunity tax discrimination inquiry. 19 9
194. This two-tier approach is discussed at Part I.B.3, supra.
195. The Court in New Mexico expressed "the underlying constitutional principle" as follows: "[A] state may not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, . . . lay a tax 'directly upon
the United States.' " 455 U.S. at 733. And, noting the fundamental nature of the principle, the
Court observed: "[Tihe Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity
from state taxation." Id.
196. In passing, the Court in New Mexico observed the discrimination aspect of the two-tier
analysis as follows: "It remains true, of course, that state taxes on contractors are constitutionally invalid if they discriminate against the Federal Government, or substantially interfere with
its activities." Id at 735, n. 11.
197. 103 S. Ct. 1344 (1983).
198. The Court has allowed the states a great deal of latitude in the tax area. So long as a
scheme of taxation is not "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious" it will be sustained by the Court.
In this context, the Court in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) stated:
There is a presumption of constitutionality which can be overcome 'only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination
against particular persons and classes.' . . . The burden is on the one attacking the
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.
Id at 364. And, on the difficulty of upsetting a tax under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court noted:
A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the
limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of
such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it
was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its actions. Only by faithful
adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to
preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.
Id at 364-65. According to this, then, it is abundantly clear that the states may, inter a/ia,
impose a heavier tax burden on some taxpayers than others. But as discussed, intra, when the
classification of taxpayers is based on the taxpayer's relationship with the Federal Government,
the Supremacy Clause imposes more stringent restrictions on the states.
199. In general, under the Supremacy Clause, the Federal Government and those with
whom it deals may be taxed in a different manner so long as there is not discriminatory economic impact. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text. The distinction between tax
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and tax discrimination under the Supremacy
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But the Court's decisions are not always clear on this point. 200 Notwithstanding occasional judicial indiscretions in this area, the Court has generally kept the various tax discrimination theories disentangled.
The tax discrimination concept in general, and in particular as it relates
to federal immunity, is not an absolute limitation. Instead, it is a characterization of various discriminatory classifications as permissible or impermissible based on legal and policy considerations. This was the approach taken
by the Court in the Washington decision. By a 5-4 majority, the Court in
Washington sustained as nondiscriminatory the Washington sales and use tax
scheme as applied to Government construction contractors. 20 ' The tax
scheme in issue is best understood against its distinct three-stage development.20 2 In the first two stages all construction contractors were treated the
same. In the final stage, however, Federal Government construction contractors were singled out for special consideration. From its inception in
1935 until 1941, the Washington sales and use tax was applied to all construction contractors in a similar manner.2 03 The sales tax was applied to all
sales of tangible personal property to the contractors, and the use tax was
applied to the use of tangible personal property by the contractor not previously subjected to the sales tax. 20 4 The legal incidence of these taxes were on
20 5
the contractors.
In 1941, Washington changed its tax scheme by redefining "consumer"
Clause was alluded to by the Court in Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School District, 361
U.S. 376 (1960) as follows:
It is true that perfection is by no means required under the equal protection test of
permissible classification. But we have made it clear, in the equal protection cases,
that our decisions in that field are not necessarily controlling where problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved. In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 1358
U.S. 522 (1959)], for example, we noted that the State was "dealing with [its] proper
domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National Government." . . . When such is the case, the State's power to classify is, indeed, extremely
broad, and its discretion is limited only by constitutional rights and by the doctrine
that a classification may not be palpably arbitrary. . . . But where taxation of the
private use of the Government's property is concerned, the Government's interest
must be weighed in the balance. Accordingly, it does not seem too much to require
that the State treat those who deal with the Government as well as it treats those with
whom it deals itself.
200. See, e.g., United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473-74 (1958). In Detroit, referring to the class of taxpayers covered by the Michigan possessory use tax, the Court observed:
The class defined is not an arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory one. As suggested
before the legislature apparently was trying to equate the tax burden imposed on private enterprise using exempt property with that carried by similar businesses using
taxed property. Those using exempt property are required to pay no greater tax than
that placed on private owners or passed on by them to their business lessees. In the
absence of such equalization the lessees of tax-exempt property might well be given a
distinct economic preference over their neighboring competitors, as well as escaping
their fair share of local tax responsibility.
Id at 473-74.
201. The Washington sales and use tax is imposed on the buyer or consumer in all retail
sales and consumer uses of tangible personal property. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4306. The sales tax is
imposed by Chapters 82.08 and 82.14 of the Revised Code of Washington. The use tax is
imposed by Chapters 82.12 and 82.14. The terms "buyer" and "consumer" are defined at sections 82.04.190, 82.08.010, and 82.12.010.
202. 103 S.Ct. at 1346-47, 1352.
203. Id at 1352.
204. Id at 1346, 1352.
205. Id. at 1346.
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as the landowner who purchases construction work from the contractor.
The legal incidence of the tax was thereby shifted to the landowner and the
tax was measured by the total amount paid to the contractor. 20 7 The effect
of this change was to increase the overall tax base, which theretofore included only the cost of the material, by including the contractor's mark-up
on materials, labor costs and profit.20 8 As before, the federal contractors
were treated essentially the same as state and private contractors. Under this
system, when the Federal Government was the landowner, Washington did
not collect tax on the sale of tangible personal property to the contractor or
of the completed project to the Government. 20 9 The tax base was decreased
210
in this respect.
In 1975, in order to reach federal construction projects without reducing
the tax base of other construction projects, the sales and use tax statute was
once again amended. 2 11 The consequence of this change was to divide construction contractors into two categories: (1) those performing construction
services on real property owned by the United States; and (2) those performing construction services for the state or a private party. 2 12 In the first instance, the legal incidence of the sales and use taxes was on the federal
construction contractors and they were liable for the taxes on material incorporated in their projects. 213 With respect to construction contractors for the
state or private parties, however, there was no sales or use tax liability for
materials incorporated in their projects. Instead, for non-federal projects,
the legal incidence of the taxes falls upon the landowner and they are liable
for tax on the full price of the project including labor costs, costs of materials
and mark-ups thereon, and profit. 2 14 Thus, while the sales and use taxes are
in each case applied at only one level, the levels for each are different.
Whereas the taxes on federal projects are applied at the contractor level,
they are applied at the landowner level for non-federal projects. The Government argued that this difference is unconstitutionally discriminatory
21 5
against those dealing with the Federal Government.
The United States prevailed in the District Court for the Western District of Washington, with that Court holding that the taxes were unconstitutionally discriminatory against federal contractors. 21 6 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.2 17 The Supreme Court noted
218
probable jurisdiction.
In response to the Government's contention that the different tax treat206. Id

207. Id
208. Id.
209. Id
210. Id at 1352.
211. Id at 1347 n. 3. This change was affected by redefining certain critical terms, viz.,
"consumer, retail sale and sale at retail." Id.
212. Id.at 1353.

213. Id
214. Id.at 1347.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Washington, 654 F.2d 570 (1981).
218. 103 S. Ct. at 1347.
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ment of federal contractors was unconstitutionally discriminatory, the Court
noted that the tax rate imposed on all construction transactions was always
equal, and the difference between the tax imposed on the private contractor
and the federal contractor was that the amount of tax was less for the latter. 2 19 This could hardly be considered discriminatory as to the Federal
Government, as the court pointed out. 220 The Court refused to look only at
the tax the contractor is legally required to pay. 22 1 Instead, considering the
"whole tax structure of the state," the Court focused on the economic forces
222
that dictate which party ultimately bears the burden of the tax.
The appropriate question is whether a contractor who is considering working for the Federal Government is faced with a cost he
would not have to bear if he were to do the same work for a private
party. If he works for the Federal Government, the contractor is
required to pay a tax on the materials he buys. The contractor will
count the tax among his costs in setting a price for the Government. Depending on his bargaining power, he may pass some or
all of the tax on to the Federal Government when he sets his price.
If he works for a private party, the contractor is required to collect
the tax from the purchaser and remit it to the state. The purchaser
will count the tax as part of the price of the building. Depending
on his bargaining power, the contractor may reduce his price to
make up for some or all of the tax the purchaser must pay. If the
tax is the same, and the parties have the same bargaining power,
the amounts the purchasers pay and the amounts the contractors
receive will be identical in the two cases. Thus, itmakes no difrence to
the contractor (or to the purchasers) which of them is [legally required to
pay the tax to the State, as long as they have the opportunity to allocate the
burden among themselves by adjusting the price.223
In light of these observations and conclusions, the Court discussed its prior
decisions in the area.
Looking at the "whole tax structure" rather than the isolated tax on
Federal contractors, the Court easily distinguished Washigton from its prior
decisions invalidating state tax schemes which placed a heavier tax burden
on those dealing with the Federal Government than on those dealing with
the state. 224 Again looking at the "whole tax structure," the Court rejected
the notion that the Washington statutory scheme did not provide a political
check on abusive taxation by the state.2 25 Instead, the Court concluded that
in light of the broad application of the tax scheme in issue, "there is little
chance that the State will take advantage of the Federal Government by
' 226
increasing the tax."
219. Id.at 1348.
220. Id

221. Id at n. 4.
222. Id at n. 4, 1348.
223. Id at 1348 n. 4 (emphasis added).
224. Id at 1348-44 (distinguishing Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School
Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960); Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961).
225. 103 S.Ct. at 1350. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that there was "no
broad state constituency taxed as are the prime contractors who deal with the Federal Government." 654 F.2d at 577.
226. 103 S. Ct. at 1350.
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The Court also recognized striking similarities between the Washington
tax system and those in United States v. Cit of Detroit 22 7 and United States .
County of Fresno.228 In those cases the Court had sustained the differential tax
treatment used by Michigan and California, respectively, to get at otherwise
tax-exempt property.
In the Detrot case, Michigan provided differential tax treatment for
users of property depending on the tax status of the property. 229 If the property being used was taxable, the user would not be subject to the tax. Instead, the owner of the property would be assessed with a general ad valorem
property tax. 230 On the other hand, if the property enjoyed tax-exempt status, the tax, measured as though the user were the owner of the property,
would be imposed on the user. 23 ' The Detroit Court approvingly described
the impact of the tax by pointing to the legislature's attempt to equalize the
tax burden on a private enterprise using tax-exempt property and the tax
burden of a business using taxed property. 232 In the Fresno case, the Court
sustained a similar tax scheme.
Finding the tax schemes in Fresno and Detroit indistinguishable from
that in Washitgton, the Court concluded:
This answers the United States' contention that the Washington
tax is invalid simply because it is an attempt to circumvent the
Federal Government's tax immunity. The Washington statute is
no different from any other taxing scheme that switches the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when
the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune. In this re233
spect, this case is no different from Fresno or Detroit.
The Court then observed that the "important consideration . . .is not
whether the state differentiates in determining what entity shall bear the
legal incidence of the tax, but whether the tax is discriminatory with regard
to the economic burdens that result." 234 This does not require, however,
that the economic burdens of the tax be equal, in fact, on all similarly situated parties. 235 It does require, however, that the parties have an opportunity
227. 355 U.S. 466 (1958). See supra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
228. 429 U.S. 452 (1977). See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
229. 355 U.S. at 467, 473.

230. Id
231. Id
232. Id. at 474.
233. 130 S. Ct. at 1349 n.9.
234. Id. at 1349.
235. Id. at 4307. On this point the Court was responding to the Ninth Circuit opinion
wherein that court commented on the state's burden in tax discrimination cases as follows:
Nor is there anything in the record from which to conclude that the economic incidence of the sales and use taxes would necessarily be shifted from the owners of nonfederal land to their prime contractors. Therefore, it has not been demonstrated that
the tax burdens on all contractors are, in fact, equalized.
654 F.2d at 576.
And, in a footnote the Ninth Circuit suggested the nature of the documentation to be
provided as follows:
In the instant case, there are no findings, economic data, or demonstrated market
assumptions in the record from which to conclude that: 1) the owners of non-federal
property have sufficient market power vis-a-vis prime contractors to pass on the economic incidence of the subject tax; 2) even if such market power exists generally, why
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to allocate the economic burden of the tax by adjusting the price. 236 Since
in the Court's view Washington's tax system satisfied these requirements, it
was determined to be nondiscriminatory. The Court concluded: "Washington has not singled out contractors who work for the United States for discriminatory treatment. It has merely accommodated for the fact that it may
' 237
not impose a tax directly on the United States as the project owner.
The four dissenting Justices, however, cast the Washington tax scheme
as a circumvention of "the United States' absolute constitutional immunity
from state taxation. ' 238 They questioned the Court's decision as a matter of
law and as a matter of fact.
First, as a matter of law, the dissenters cited three of the Court's earlier
decisions which, in their view, compelled an affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's decision. 239 And, in passing the dissenting mentioned Fresno by pointing out that in that case "the United States expressly abandoned any claim
that the tax treated federal employees differently from state employees who
lived in state owned houses". 24° But it was the omitted discussion of the
Detroit case that was most noteworthy. 24 1 The dissent also challenged as
"glib" and "unwarranted" the majority's conclusion "that the Federal Government is really better off than others because the tax consequence to it is a
lesser amount inasmuch as the contractor's labor costs and markup are not
included in the tax base."' 242 The dissent questioned the Court's holding on
this point by noting that the cost of putting the tax money "up front" and of
maintaining special records required only of the Federal contractor, could
well exceed the tax increments on the labor and profit components. 24 3 The
dissent also found "highly suspect" the Court's assumption that a federal
contractor will be able to pass the tax through to the Federal
Government.

24 4

all owners of non-federal property would necessarily have sufficient market power to
allow each of them to pass on all of the economic incidence to prime contractors; and
3) even if both of these conclusions are now true, that they will remain so, notwithstanding any changes in economic conditions.
Id at 576 n. 12.
236. 103 S. Ct. at 1348 n.4.
237. d at 1350.
238. Id at 1351.
239. Id at 1354. The cases cited were Miler v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927); Phillps
Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 379 (1969); Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365
U.S. 744 (1961). It is clear from a reading of these cases, however, that they are far from
compelling and, in fact, easily distinguished from the Washington situation. Moreover, these
cases were apparently considered by the dissent without regard for the Court's other decisions in
this area. Most notably among these are the Fresno and Detroit cases.
240. 103 S.Ct. at 1355 (quoting 429 U.S. at 452, 464 n. 13). The import of this cryptic
revelation is not entirely clear. Was it intended to vitiate the majority's comparison of Fresno
and Washington?
241. Clearly, Fresno and Detroit present problems to the dissent's position; a position that is
not easily reconciled, if at all, with those cases.
242. 103 S. Ct. at 1353.
243. Id. at 1355.
244. Id. at 1355 n. 4. The dissent states two reasons for its position on this issue:
First, the assumption hardly can be applied to a contract made prior to the 1975
legislation. A contractor trapped with such a contract has the burden of the tax; a
private contractor is not at the same risk. Second, the Court seems to believe that a
federal contractor has the same amount of bargaining power with the Federal Govern-
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On a practical note, the dissent observed that "the Court, in order to
prevent abuse, will have to dissect and carefully measure every state system
that imposes a tax burden upon the United States."' 245 In this regard, the
dissent noted "that courts as institutions are poorly equipped to evaluate the
246
relative burdens of various methods of taxation.1
C.

United States v. Colorado--ConstitutionalLimitations on the Application of
the Possessory Use Tax to Government Contractors

The possessory use tax compliments the general ad valorem property
tax by taxing the private use of tax-exempt property. 24 7 The subject of the
tax is the private use of tax-exempt property. The tax is typically measured
and assessed as though the user were the owner of the property. Although
the possessory use tax has been sustained by the Court under certain circumstances, 248 its imposition is not without limits. In particular, questions have
been raised concerning the imposition of a tax, measured in terms of full
value, on the private use of tax-exempt property when there are contractual
2 49
restrictions on the use of the property rendering such use less valuable.
This was the nature of the Tenth Circuit's inquiry in United States v.
Colorado.250
The Colorado case involved a Department of Energy contract with
Rockwell International Corporation for the operation and maintenance of
the Rocky Flats Plant-Government-owned facilities operated for the development and production of nuclear weapons-located in Jefferson County,
Colorado. 25' In return for its services, Rockwell was reimbursed its costs and
paid a fixed fee. 252 In light of these contractual undertakings, the Jefferson
County Tax Assessor assessed Rockwell with a possessory use tax for the use
of tax-exempt property-the Rocky Flats Plant. 253 The tax assessed against
ment as his private counterpart has with his contractual partner. I suspect that in
most circumstances this is not correct. Under Washington's tax, a private contractor
charges his client the amount of the state tax on top of the contract price; it is far from
clear that a federal contractor is able to pass the tax on in the same way to the Federal
Government.
Id
245. Id at 1356.
246. Id (quoting Minneapolis Star Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'n v. Revenue, 103 S. Ct.
1365, 1374 (1983)).
247. For a discussion of the possessory use tax see supra notes 32-33, 90-134 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. Township of
Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
249. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462 n.10 (1977).
250. 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980),sumarnaffdsub nom Jefferson County v. United States,
450 U.S. 901 (1981).
251. 627 F.2d at 218.
252. United States v. Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184, 1185-87 (D. Colo. 1978).
253. The Colorado statute, a typical possissory use tax, provides in part:
(1) When any property . . . exempt from taxation is leased, loaned, or otherwise
made available to and used by a . . . corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit, the lessee or user thereof shall be subject to taxation in the same
amount and to the same extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of such
property. ...
Id. at 1187.
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254
Rockwell for 1976 was in excess of 4.5 million dollars.

The issue before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the Colorado case was whether the possessory use tax, as applied against Rockwell for
its use of the Rocky Flats Plant, was a constitutional enactment by the State.
As expressed by the court, the key to this issue "is the relationship between
Rockwell and the United States and the nature of the activity which the
State of Colorado seeks to tax."' 255 The district court determined that the
tax as applied was unconstitutional and entered a summary judgment for
the Government. 256 The state appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit
2 57
and ultimately to the Supreme Court.
In reaching its decision, the district court first distinguished UnitedStates
v.Boyd where the Supreme court sustained the application of the Tennessee
compensating use tax to Government contractors. 258 In discussing Boyd, the
district court stressed that the Boyd Court had determined that the contractor had a "separate taxable interest." In this context, the district court discussed the Supreme Court's implicit notion that a tax on the cost of supplies
and materials obtained with government funds would constitute an appropriate measure of the separate taxable interest. 259 After setting up Boyd in
this fashion, the court proceeded to distinguish it from the assessment in
issue.
The distinction noted by the court was that Colorado, unlike Tennessee
in the Boyd case, had made no effort to separate out the Government's ownership interest in the property. 26° And, following up on this theme the court
observed:
The Supreme Court has said there is no constitutional impediment
to state and local taxation of the benefit to Rockwell as measured
by its separate interest in the Government-owned property used in
the performance of the contract. When, however, a tax is imposed
upon the whole value of the property, it is obvious that the tax is
also being imposed upon the Government's interest and that is con26 1
trary to the Constitution.
The district court had less difficulty distinguishing the United States v. County
254. Id The District Court expressed concern about the tax liability as compared to
Rockwell's fee under the contract. Id at 1188.
255. 627 F.2d at 219.
256. 460 F. Supp. at 1189.
257. 627 F.2d 217, summarily afdsub nom Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901
(1981).
258. For a discussion of the Boyd decision see supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
259. 460 F. Supp. at 1188. The district court's reading of Boyd is strained. Boyd was concerned with legal incidence of the tax rather than the measure of the tax. See supra notes 82, 179
and accompanying text. The Court in Boyd was clearly not concerned with comparing the
relative interests of the Government and its contractors. Indeed, the Court's focus was on the
transaction in issue (the use of property not previously subject to a sales tax) and not the relative
interests in the property being used.
260. Id. To reiterate, it seems that the district court has strayed. The court in Boyd did not
attempt to segregate the various interests of the parties because the compensating use tax in
issue was assessed on a transactional (sale or use) basis. But, the possessory use tax in Colorado
is complementary to the general ad valorem property tax which is a tax on ownership. Thus, it
is important to keep in mind that the taxes in Boyd and Colorado are substantially different. Id
261. Id
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of Fresno case in which the Supreme Court had sustained a possessory use tax
which segregated the user's limited interest in the property. 262 Conversely,
the Colorado statute provided that the user would be taxed as though it were
the owner. 2 63 With this, the district court concluded that the tax was "nothing less than a general ad valorem property tax imposed on United States
property. It is a tax on the property itself rather than Rockwell's beneficial
'26
use of it.
In reaching its decision, the district court determined that the Colorado
tax was the same as that invalidated in UnitedStates v. Allegheny County where
the tax assessor had included Government-owned machinery in the assessment of a private plant.2 65 Citing footnote 10 of the Fresno case, the court
noted the continuing validity of Allegheny. 266 In particular, with respect to
segregating the contractor's limited interest in Government-owned property,
the court cited the following excerpt from footnote 10 of Fresno:
Insofar as [Allegheny] stands for the proposition that Government
property used by a private citizen may not be taxed at its full value
where contractual restrictions on its use for the Government's benefit render the property less valuable to the user, the case has no
application here. Appellee counties have sought to tax only the
individual appellants' interests in the Forest Service houses and
have reduced their assessments to take account of the limitations
267
on the use of the houses imposed by the Government.
Thus, without any meaningful discussion of United States v. City of Detroit or
its companion cases, the district court, based on the decisions discussed
above, held that the tax constituted an unconstitutional infringement on the
268
Government's immunity from taxation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court but found it necessary to
distinguish three cases relied on by the State of Colorado-United States v.
Boyd, 269 United States v. City of Detroit ,270 and United States v. Township of Muskegon. 27 I First apparently rejecting the lower court's "separate interests"
262. 429 U.S. at 452. For a discussion ofFresno see supra notes 129-134, 142-144 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 253.
264. 460 F. Supp. at 1189. In light ofUnitedSlates v. Ciy of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), and
its companion cases, see supra notes 102-129 and accompanying text, the district court's conclusion, without more, that the Colorado possessory use tax was nothing more than a general ad
valorem property tax on the owner of the property is confusing.
265. Id For a discussion of Allegheny, see supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
266. Id. See supra note 132.
267. 429 U.S. at 463 n.10.
268. 460 F. Supp. at 1189.
By taxing the totality of the land, improvements and personal property used in the
operations of the Rocky Flats Plant, without accounting for any of the imposed limitations on Rockwell's use of the property, the defendants have subjected the property
and activities of the Federal Government to state and local taxation and thereby infringed upon the immunity of the United States from the imposition of taxes on its
own property. Id
269. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
270. 355 U.S. 466 (1958). For a discussion of the Detroit case see supra notes 101-115 and
accompanying text.
271. 355 U.S. 484 (1958). For a discussion ofMuskegon see supra notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
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analysis of Boyd ,272 the court distinguished Boyd from Colorado in terms of the
different tax schemes involved. 273 In Boyd a sales and compensating use tax
was measured by the purchase price or fair market value of the property
used by the contractor and collected on a one-time basis. 274 The contractor
in Boyd had purchased the property from third parties for use in performing
its contract. 275 In comparison, the court noted that Colorado was not seeking to impose a tax on goods acquired by Rockwell for its contract with the
United States, but rather the tax was measured by the value of the Govern276
ment-owned Rocky Flats Plant and based on Rockwell's use such facility.
.277
The court found this a significant distinction between Boyd and Colorado
While the lower court made no effort to distinguish Detroit or Muskegon
from the Colorado case, the Tenth Circuit distinguished these cases based on
the nature of the use of the Government-owned property in issue. 278 In Detroit, the contractor leased part of a Government-owned industrial plant for
its private manufacturing business. 2 79 In Muskegon, the contractor used a
Government-owned manufacturing plant for the production of goods for the
Government. 2 0 The court concluded that " [nleither [Detroit nor Muskegon]
is akin to the instant case, where Rockwell is merely performing its contractual obligations on Government owned property. 28 1 Like the lower court,
the Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. County of Allegheny 28 2 in rejecting
283
as unconstitutional the Colorado possessory use tax applied to Rockwell.
As in Allegheny, the court concluded that in substance the tax was an ad
2 84
valorem general property tax on property owned by the United States.
The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. 28 5
D.

Federal Immunity of Government Contractorsfrom State and Local TaxationImpact of New Mexico, Washington and Colorado on the State of
the Law
Of course, it is not enough to recount the historical development of the

272. See supra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
273. 627 F.2d at 220. The court distinguished Boyd on the particulars of the taxes involved.
But the decision in this context is short on analysis; it does not provide any justification for the
different treatment of the different tax schemes; and it does not in any meaningful way explain
the legal significance of the different characteristics. Implicit in the decision, however, is that
these distinctions are of a constitutional dimension. Id
274. Id.
275. Id But the compensating use tax could be applied under the Tennessee statute even if
the property had not been purchased by the contractor and, therefore, the court may be overstating this factor unless it is implying that the constitutionality of the Boyd tax rests on this
point. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id
278. Id
279. Id
280. Id
281. Id As discussed with respect to Boyd, the court concludes that the distinctions between
these cases are constitutionally significant. And, as in its discussion of Boyd, the court apparently believes that the legal significance of these distinctions are self-evident.
282. 322 U.S. at 174.
283. 627 F.2d at 220, 221.
284. Id. at 221.
285. Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901 (1981).
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federal immunity doctrine as it relates to Government contractors and the
recent decisions cited above. Indeed, the import of these recent decisions can
only be understood in light of their historical background. In this context,
three points should be recalled from Part I. First, the doctrine of federal
immunity has gone through two distinct phases-an expansionary period
and then a period of contraction. Second, a two-tiered test has evolved for
determining the constitutional validity of state and local taxes on the Government and those with whom it deals. Third, state and local taxes come in
various forms each with different characteristics. These points each bear
upon the discussion which follows.
Two of the three decisions-New Mexico and Washington-mark the continuance of the unmistakeable trend of the Court to constrict where possible
the once expansive federal immunity doctrine. Colorado, on the other hand,
was a departure from this trend. There was, however, unanimity that the
constitutional standard for reviewing state taxes was the two-tiered test referred to above. Two of the cases, New Mexico and Colorado, were decided on
the first tier, the legal incidence test, and the other, Washington, was decided
on the second tier, the discrimination test.
The most direct impact of New Mexico on prior law is its effect on the
Kern-Limerck decision and the procurement agency concept announced
therein. 28 6 While not expressly overruling Kern-Limerick, it appears that the
Court will carefully consider each case on its particular facts and will apply
Kern-Limerick strictly, if at all, when considering the agency issue. This implication is evident from the Court's lack of enthusiasm for the Government's attempt to avoid state taxes by creating an agency relationship
through contracts with private contractors. The Court stated that "a finding
of constitutional tax immunity requires something more than the invocation
of traditional agency notions: to resist the state's taxing power, a private
taxpayer must actually 'stand in the Government's shoes.' ",287 Along the
same lines, the Court, citing in part in Kern-Limerick dissent, noted:
Granting tax immunity only to entities that have been "incorporated into the Government structure" can forestall, at least to a
degree, some of the manipulation and wooden formalism that occasionally have marked tax litigation-and that have no proper place
in determining the allocation of power between co-existing sovereignties. In this case, for example, the Government and its contractors modified their agreements two years into the litigation in an
obvious attempt to strengthen the case for nonliability ...
[Moreover,] the Government earnestly argues that its contractors
are entitled to tax immunity because, among other things, they
draw checks directly on federal funds, instead of waiting a time for
reimbursement. . . . We cannot believe that an immunity of constitutional stature rests on such technical considerations, for that
approach allows "any government functionary to draw the consti-

286.

For a discussion of the Kern-Limerick decision see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying

text.

287.

United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 236.
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tutional line by changing a few words in a contract.

' 288

So, in addition to its severe constriction of Kern-Limerick, the Court expressed
its concern for the drawing of constitutional lines based on technical provi2 89
sions in Government contracts.
Although the impact of New Mexico on prior law is essentially limited to
its restriction of the procurement agent concept, the Court's recap of the
2 90
development of the federal immunity doctrine will also be remembered.
In addition, the invitation by the Court for congressional intervention in this
29
area is noteworthy. '
A reading of Detroit and Fresno make it difficult to view Washington as a
significant development in the area of tax discrimination. 29 2 In those cases,
as in Washington, the Court sustained a tax scheme which provided a different method of taxation for the Government and those dealing with it than
for others similarly situated. Although the tax methodology in all three cases
was different for different classes of taxpayers, the economic burden of the
tax was in each case judged to be the same for all. Thus, while the legal
incidence test had developed into a very formalistic test, the tax discrimination doctrine was concerned with the economic substance of the tax
scheme. 29 3 This theme, expressed in Detroit and Fresno, was described in
greater detail in Washington.
While it is clear that the tax discrimination doctrine enunciated by the
Court does not allow the states to impose a heavier tax burden on the Government or those with whom it deals, the question of what constitutes a
heavier tax burden is not so clear. But the Court in Washington did indicate
that it considers the tax rate and tax base to be important factors. 294 With
respect to the tax rate, the Court noted that it was the same for all construction transactions. 2 95 And, regarding the tax base, the Court observed that
the Government and its contractors were treated more favorably than others
296
because they were taxed on a smaller proportion of the project value.
Considering these two characteristics of the tax, the Court concluded that
the Government and its contractors are both better off than other taxpayers
because they pay less than anyone else in the state.2 9 7 But the majority was
clearly not interested in a detailed examination of the relative burdens of the
288. Id at 737.
289. This is seemingly at odds with the Colorado case wherein the lower court and the Tenth
Circuit held that contractual restrictions on the contractor's use of Government-owned property
required the state to segregate the contractor's limited interest in the property. Such contractual restrictions are seemingly the same sort of technical considerations and subject to the same
manipulation as those provisions referenced by the Court in New Mexico.
290. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1344.
291. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
292. 103 S. Ct. at 1349-50. "The only difference between [Washington] and Fresno and Detroit
is that the taxpayer here is a vendor of services to the United States, rather than one who
receives an economic benefit from the Federal Government. To rest upon such a distinction
would be to elevate form over substance." Id
293. Id at 1348-49.
294. Id. at 1348. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
295. Id
296. Id
297. Id
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tax scheme and, in particular, the majority did not consider in its opinion
298
the burdens outlined by the dissent.
Washington does not, it seems, constitute a departure from previous decisions. But it does put beyond doubt the broad power of the state and local
governments to fine tune their tax laws in any manner that does not have a
discriminatory economic impact on the Government or those with whom it
deals.
Of the three cases, Colorado has had the most unsettling effect on the
state of the law. It cuts against the basic trend to constrict the once broad
federal immunity concept and it raises specific issues concerning both the
compensating use and possessory use taxes. The questions raised concerning
compensating use taxes revolve around the attempt by the Colorado District
Court and the Tenth Circuit to distinguish Colorado from Boyd. The District
Court plainly missed the essential nature of the compensating use tax in its
analysis of Boyd. The compensating use tax complements the sales tax,
which taxes a particular transaction-sales, it is a transactional tax. On the
other hand, the possessory use tax complements the ad valorem property tax,
which taxes property ownership interests. Unfortunately, the District Court
was seemingly unaware of this distinction.2 99 Without clarifying the lower
court's opinion on this point, the Tenth Circuit, in a conclusory fashion,
noted that the tax in Boyd was sufficiently different from the tax in Colorado
3°°
to justify a different result.
But Colorado is more unsettling because of its limitations on the possessory use tax cases Detroit and Muskegon, and its resurrection of Allegheny. In
distinguishing Detroit and Muskegon, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the nature of the contractors' activities. 30 While both Detroit and Muskegon concerned the use of government property in manufacturing businesses, the
contractor in Colorado was merely going onto the property to perform its
management services. 30 2 From this it is clear that the nature of the activity
has taken on a new dimension in possessory use tax cases. But, of course, this
leaves many questions unanswered. For example, what activities may be
taxed under these schemes and what is the proper measurement of the tax.
Following its discussion of Detroit and Muskegon, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Allegheny, determined that the Colorado tax was in substance an ad
valorem general property tax on property of the United States and, therefore, prohibited by the Constitution. 30 3 This determination is significant in
two ways. First, the court's reliance on substance over form is a marked
departure from the formalistic legal incidence test. Second, the court leaves
open the question of what measure short of full valuation is constitutionally
acceptable under the Colorado circumstances.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id
See
See
See
Id
See

at 1355. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
supra notes 272-276 and accompanying text.
supra notes 277-280 and accompanying text.
supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
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THE IMPACT OF NEW MEXICO, WASHINGTON AND COLORADO ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES

At one point in its opinion, the New Mexico Court stated: "We cannot
believe that an immunity of constitutional stature rests on such technical considerations, for that approach allows 'any Governmentfunctionay to draw the
constitutional line by changing a few words in the contract.' -304 The "technical considerations" referred to by the Court were certain contractual provisions included in the contracts between the taxpayer-contractors and the
Government. And, of course, the Government functionaries are the Government bureaucrats that prepare, negotiate and administer the Government's
contracts, viz., contracting officers and their legal counsel. While the Court
may be correct in its assertion that constitutional lines should not be drawn
by Government functionaries by merely changing a few words in a contract,
it is the same Government functionaries which must react to the constitutional lines drawn by the Court's "unsteady hand. ' 30 5 In this regard, contracting officers and their legal counsel must be ready to adjust procurement
policies and procedures to comply with the Court's decisions and at the same
time, to the extent feasible, protect the federal fisc from over-zealous state
and local governments. This task is complicated because many states, already sensitive to the President Reagan's "new federalism" and facing substantial budget deficits, are searching for additional revenues.
To make matters worse, these cases, particularly New Mexico, have created a heightened awareness of the potential revenues that may be obtained
under the proper tax scheme. While it is true that Supreme Court cases
generally have a certain degree of notoriety, New Mexico is especially notable
because of the unprecedented amount of the tax liability finally stipulated
by the parties. The amount agreed to and ultimately paid to the state was
roughly $280 million. 30 6 This figure will undoubtedly arouse other states to
take a hard look at their tax structures to ensure that they are not unnecessarily or unwittingly missing Government contractors.
A.

Problems in Contract Formation and Admiistration

Government contracts typically deal with state and local taxes in one of
two ways depending upon the type contract involved. With respect to costtype contracts, state and local taxes are generally allowable costs and reimbursable to the contractor. 30 7 But if there is a claim of illegality or erroneous
assessment, the taxes are allowable only if the contractor, prior to payment
of such taxes, requests instructions from the contracting officer and takes all
304. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 737 (1982) (emphasis added).
305. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 176 (1944).
306. This situation has drawn considerable attention from the highest levels of the New
Mexico State Government and the Federal Government. Of course, a payment of more than a
quarter of a billion dollars in times of enormous budget deficits attracts considerable attention
and scrutiny by those concerned with such matters.

307. Federal Procurement Regultions, 41 CFR §1-15.205-41 (1983); Defense Acquisition
Regulation 15-205.41 (1983). "In general, taxes ... which the contractor is required to pay
and which are paid or accrued in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles are
allowable ..
" Id at §1-15.205-41(1).
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action directed by the contracting officer. 308 Thus, under cost-type contracts, contractors are essentially conduits for the payment of taxes; however,
their position is not without risk as they have primary responsibility for the
proper payment of taxes. Improper payment of taxes or the failure to seek
the contracting officer's instructions may result in nonreimbursable costs to
the contractor.
Conversely, fixed-price contracts generally provide that the contract
price includes all applicable taxes. 30 9 Thus, as opposed to a cost-type contractor, a fixed price contractor must include its estimated taxes in the contract price and is not otherwise compensated for such expenses. There are
circumstances, however, when special tax clauses which include or exclude
from the contract price a specific tax may be approved. 310 For example,
"[sluch special treatment may be required . . .where the State or local tax
law has been recently changed, where there is doubt as to the applicability
or allocability of the tax, or where the applicability of the tax is being litigated.13 11 In addition to an amount for those taxes which are clearly valid,
the contractor may also wish to include in the contract price an amount for
3 12
questionable taxes.
To the extent the cases discussed above provide clear and straightforward guidance they generally make the contracting process less cumbersome. When liability for tax is not in issue cost-type contractors need not
seek guidance concerning the propriety of the tax and fixed-price contractors
can estimate contract prices with some certainty, obviating the need for special tax clauses. A degree of certainty in the tax area facilitates the formation and administration of Government contracts. On the other hand,
uncertainty in the tax area has just the opposite effect. Cost-type contractors
will find it necessary to seek guidance concerning questionable tax laws and
procedures and fixed-price contractors may, in the absence of a special tax
clause, find it necessary to bid in a contingency amount to cover potential
tax liability.
As noted above, Colorado has had the most unsettling effect on the state
308. The Procurement Regulation provides in pertinent part:
(b) Taxes otherwise allowable under paragraph (a) of this section, but upon which
a claim of illegality or erroneous assessment exists, are allowable provided the contractor prior to payment of such taxes:
(1) Promptly requests instructions from the contracting officer concerning such
taxes; and
(2) Takes all action directed by the contracting officer arising out of paragraph
(b)(1) of this section or an independent decision of the Government as to the existence
of a claim of illegality or erroneous assessment, including cooperation with and for the
benefit of the Government to (i) determine the legality of such assessment, or
(ii) secure a refund of such taxes. 41 CFR §1-15.205-41.
309. 41 CFR §1-11.401 (1983).
310. Id at §1-11.401-4(a).
311. Id These special tax clauses must typically be approved at a high level within the
various agencies. Id at § I-I 1.401-4(d).
312. If adequate price competition exists, it is unlikely that the bidding contractors will
include an unnecessary contingency amount for questionable taxes and, therefore, a special tax
clause may not be warranted. In a non-competitive atmosphere, however, contractors cannot
be expected to take such risks upon themselves. But, even in a competitive environment, if the
potential tax liability is substantial as compared to the contract price, the competing contractors may not be willing to accept the risks and a special tax clause may be in order.
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of the law. It has left the states and the Federal Government scrambling to
ascertain the constitutional parameters of the possessory use tax; and, by
necessity, it has left in its wake a litigious atmosphere. This situation has
resulted in numerous contractor requests for guidance and special tax
clauses; it has further burdened an already overburdened procurement
process.
The New Mexico decision left little room for dispute and, therefore, will
not complicate matters in the same way as Colorado. But for those agencies
using the procurement agent concept before New Mexico, it seems that a review of the complex contract provisions used to support the procurement
agent concept is in order. To the extent such provisions serve no other useful
purpose, they should be abandoned.
B.

Contracting-Outfor Goods and Services or In-House Performance

An Agency may satisfy its needs in one of three ways. It may use its
own employees, requisition its needs from another agency, or procure its requirements from the private sector. While there are many instances where
the choice will be clear-cut, there are other situations where more than one
of the three alternatives is practicable. But because of concern that the Government should not compete with private enterprise, the executive branch
has expressed a policy favoring the use of the private sector to the maximum
extent practicable. 3 13 In this context, the Office of Management and
Budget Circuilar A-76 provides in part:
In a democratic free enterprise economic system, the Government
should not compete with its citizens. The private enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national economic strength. In recognition of this
principle, it has been and continues to be the general policy of the
private enterprise to supply the
Government to rely on competitive
314
products and services it needs.
Of course, there are other factors to be considered. Among other things, the
agency must determine whether it is more cost-effective to perform the function in-house or to contract with the private sector. 31 5 This is done by a
"cost comparison" study, using detailed cost data to compare the cost of in31 6
house performance with the cost of contracting-out.
One major cost issue associated with contracting-out is state and local
taxes. In this regard, tax provisions like those upheld in New Mexico and
Washington and rejected in Colorado could have a significant impact on the
cost comparison study and, ultimately, on the decision to contract out rather
than provide the products or services with in-house capability.
In passing, it should be noted that it is decidedly more difficult to bring
in-house a function previously contracted out than to contract out for a
313. OMB Circular A-76, Poliies for Acquiring Commercial or Industrial Products and Services
Needed by the Government (1982).
314. Id
315. Cost Comparison Handbook, Supplement No. I to OMB Circular A-76 (1979).
316. Id
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function previously performed in-house. First, the agencies may lack the expertise or facilities necessary to bring a function in-house. But also, there is a
general reluctance to expand the structural bureaucracy. Thus, notwithstanding that it may be more cost effective to perform the function in-house,
the institutional bias for contracting out may prevail. In the same context,
while state and local taxes may make it more costly to contract out than to
perform in-house, as noted above, the reality of the situation may well be
that the agency will continue to contract out.
C.

Budget Considerattwns

It is estimated that during fiscal year 1982 the Government spent $158
billion on the procurement of supplies and services. 3 ' 7 Assuming an aggregate state and local tax of 5% on the gross amount of $158 billion, the impact
on the procurement budget is $8 billion. But whatever the actual liability
may be, it seems certain that it is a significant amount. What is more significant though is that the amount of state and local taxes paid in connection
with Government procurements is not considered in the budget process.
Moreover, in spite of the substantial amounts involved, the executive agencies do not have any systematic means of ascertaining the amount of state
and local taxes paid. The problem is that Congress is generally unaware of
this situation when it considers the agencies budget submissions. The problem is exacerbated by the serious fiscal problems facing most state and local
governments that have forced them to search out additional revenues.
Aside from the aggregate impact of state and local taxes on the federal
budget, there is also a question concerning the allocation of this amount to
the various states. Naturally, those states with the largest dollar share of
Government procurement activities are in the best position to increase their
revenues at the expense of the Federal Government. 3 18 While there is nothing inherently wrong with such disparate sharing of federal revenues, and
while it may be true that there is a rational basis for allocating federal revenue based on the amount of Government activity within a state, it seems
that Congress should be made aware of the issue so that there can be a
319
meaningful discussion of the varied and competing interests involved.
In brief, if the Congress is to make any meaningful policy decisions concerning the state and local taxation of Government contractors, the agencies
must provide information to the Congress concerning the aggregate taxes
paid and the allocation of these taxes. 320 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
317. Obtained from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Federal Procurement Data
System.
318. Of course, the extent to which a community takes advantage of the Federal Government's largesse, will depend on its tax policies and procedures.
319. There are many competing interests in this area and plenty of room for reasonable men
to differ. For example, the federal agencies might argue that the states are sufficiently benefitted by the performance of Government contracts within their states. On the other hand, the
states may argue that the Government and its contractors receive benefits and increase the costs
of providing services to the community and, therefore, must share in the responsibility of paying
for such service.
320. While the information may not be available in a precise form, particularly with regard
to fixed price contracts, it can certainly be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
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how the Congress and the agencies can develop a budget without fully understanding the impact of state and local taxes.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Government and its contractors may find relief from state
and local taxes in one of two ways: (1) under the constitutional immunity

implied by the courts from the Supremacy Clause; or (2) by congressional
statutory immunity. With respect to the former, the Court has established a
two-tiered test for determining the constitutional validity of these tests.
First, the tax may not be laid directly on the Federal Government, and second, the tax may not discriminate against the Federal Government or those
with whom it deals. In practice, these principles have provided little relief to
the Government or its contractors when the contractors and their activities
are the subject of taxation. Significant questions remain, however, concerning the extent to which possessory use taxes may be applied to the Government and its contractors. But aside from this vestige of the once broad
immunity doctrine, it is apparent that if the executive branch wants additional relief from state and local taxation, it must be through the Congress.
If Congress is to consider this complex problem with such vast political
and economic implications, the federal agencies must document the magnitude and nature of the problem. The executive branch should begin now to
develop the necessary data to demonstrate the aggregate tax burden and the
allocation of this amount to the various states. If the agencies expect statutory relief from state and local taxes, they must make a case by demonstrating, inter ah'a, that the state and local taxes are excessive in light of the
services provided by the state and local governments. Any effort by the
executive branch to obtain statutory immunity will no doubt be met with
violent opposition and intense lobbying. But Congress and the agencies
should be made aware of the situation if for no other reason than because of
the significant impact on the procurement budget. It should be understood
by those who scrutinize the budget that state and local taxes are more than
an incidental cost of contracting.
In addition to documenting the state and local tax situation, the executive agencies must continue to ferret out and challenge improper tax
schemes. In particular, the agencies must remain vigilant in challenging, as
appropriate, possessory use tax schemes. And the agencies must make the
most of the situation by developing procurement policies and procedures to
minimize the impact of the proper tax schemes. To the extent practicable,
the agencies may want to channel their procurements to states that impose
lesser tax burdens. In the same context, the agencies may want to encourage
contractors to locate in such states. Depending on the particular tax scheme,
the agencies may also find that it is more economical to purchase the supplies and provide them to the contractor for use in performance of the contract rather than have the contractor purchase the supplies. And, of course,
the agencies may find it more economical to perform certain functions inhouse rather than contract out for them.

